Now It’s Parliament’s Turn to Lead Brexit Delusions

(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Given her countless errors in supervising Brexit, sympathy for U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May is out of the question. Even so, Parliament’s pointless move this week to take control confirms she’s not alone in preferring an alternative reality. When it comes to Brexit, there’s plenty of delusion to go around.

MPs voted to take charge of the parliamentary timetable and hold nonbinding votes on various Brexit options. These are likely to run the gamut from exiting without a withdrawal agreement through halting Brexit altogether by revoking the Article 50 exit notice. In between these extremes, in increasing order of softness, are various intermediate options: a conventional free-trade deal; the withdrawal agreement negotiated by May (which the Commons has already rejected twice, by enormous margins); May’s deal plus a permanent customs union; May’s deal plus a permanent customs union and membership of the European Union’s single market; and a second referendum together with a fundamental rethink of the whole affair.

To begin with, of course, it beggars belief that the House of Commons is settling down for this discussion almost three years after the Brexit referendum and just days before the U.K. said it would leave the union. But set the question of timing aside. The other thing of note is that this parliamentary maneuver serves no intelligible purpose.

MPs seem to be laboring under a misconception. Most of the options they’re intending to address have nothing to do with the decision Britain actually has to make by April 12 — the new exit date, recently extended from March 29 by the EU. As things stand, that decision comes down to three choices: Leave with no deal, accept the May-EU deal, or revoke Article 50. Those are the only decisions that can be made in time, and that rest solely with the U.K. All the others would require the EU’s assent and weeks and months of further negotiation.

The closer you look at the various options, the odder this parliamentary strategy seems. The Labour Party’s Brexit policy, to the extent it has one, appears to favor May’s deal plus a permanent customs union. But that addition has nothing to do with the terms of withdrawal already agreed, and wouldn’t call for them to be changed. The customs union is a subject for discussion in the next phase of talks, post-Brexit. If Labour MPs want this option, they should already have voted for May’s deal to resolve the immediate impasse, and then pushed for a customs union as the goal for the next round of talks.

The same goes, only more so, for the even softer option called Norway-plus or Common Market 2.0, which adds single-market membership as well as a customs union to the post-Brexit wish-list. Again, this would not require a new withdrawal agreement. It’s perfectly consistent with the withdrawal terms already negotiated with the EU — terms that the EU has said, again and again, cannot be revisited in any case. Some of the MPs behind the new parliamentary maneuver appear to like Norway-plus. The same question applies: Why didn’t they vote for the May–EU deal, allowing Britain and Europe to move to the next stage of talks when this softest Brexit could have been proposed?

Their answer might be that the political declaration that May and the EU attached to their withdrawal agreement doesn’t spell out these preferred endpoints. That’s true — but so what? The political declaration is nonbinding and largely meaningless. Britain’s long-term relationship with the EU is still to be negotiated. Anyone inclined to prefer a soft Brexit to no deal should have backed May when she put her withdrawal agreement before the Commons; the same goes for anyone who prefers a soft Brexit to Remain.

And therein lies the explanation for this latest round of displacement activity: The Commons maneuver is nothing more than a cry of despair over the fact that no one really wants a soft-Brexit compromise. Remainers want to remain, and Leavers want to get out from under the EU boot that’s now firmly planted on Britain’s neck — a freedom that none of these middle-way Brexits would provide.

As a theoretical matter, one can imagine another sort of soft Brexit that might have had genuine appeal for both factions. A kind of associate membership could have provided close economic integration, with voting rights and joint decision-making on those matters, without the commitment to political integration. But the EU is opposed: It rejects any further entrenching of Britain’s half-in, half-out status, and at the moment there’s no prospect of changing its mind.

This position means there’s no workable compromise and the gap between Britain’s Leavers and Remainers simply can’t be bridged. It also means that, whatever happens, no line can be drawn under the Brexit shambles. Britain might be heartily sick of the whole mess, but there’ll be no moving on.

If Britain leaves with no deal, a struggle with Europe will begin over how to mitigate the consequences and develop a workable trade relationship. If the U.K. revokes Article 50, with or without subsequent endorsement in a second referendum, Leavers will feel cheated and start planning their next Brexit campaign. Anything in between that binds the U.K with rules it has no say in framing will quickly infuriate Leavers and Remainers alike, and just won’t stick.

Some bad choices are better than others. Britain’s best bet now would be to revoke Article 50, acknowledging the comprehensive failure of all involved, allowing time to rethink, and relieving the immediate problem of negotiating under deadline from a position of self-inflicted weakness. But don’t suppose that revoking Article 50, or going for Norway-plus, or a permanent customs union, or no deal, will bring this issue to resolution. Until Europe, as well as Britain, is willing to go back to basics, there’s no seizing control of this disaster.  

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Max Berley at mberley@bloomberg.net

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Clive Crook is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and writes editorials on economics, finance and politics. He was chief Washington commentator for the Financial Times, a correspondent and editor for the Economist and a senior editor at the Atlantic.

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