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Liberalism Is Under Siege. Conservatives Can Save It.

Liberalism Is Under Siege. Conservatives Can Save It.

(Bloomberg Opinion) -- How can democratic countries resist their authoritarian rivals abroad at a time when illiberal ideas are on the rise at home? This was a challenge faced by the parties of the American and European center-left during the Cold War, when the need for a strong stand against the Soviet Union led them to break with communist sympathizers and pro-Soviet elements. A parallel problem is afflicting many of the democratic world’s conservative parties today.

As international rivalry intensifies, the core strategic task for the U.S.-led democratic community is to contain the geopolitical influence and political disruption caused by authoritarian great powers, namely China and Russia. Yet that task is made all the harder because illiberalism — and sympathy for those illiberal powers — is simultaneously surging among key actors on the political right. If the U.S. and its allies are to succeed in the great global rivalry of the 21st century, the right must confront the threat of illiberalism within its ranks — just as the left did during a previous twilight struggle in the 20th century. 

For the American left, the late 1940s served as the crucible in which Cold War liberalism was forged. In 1947, leading liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger and Hubert Humphrey founded Americans for Democratic Action, an organization that fused progressive values with fierce anti-communism. They did so in hopes of steering the Democratic Party toward a foreign policy based on energetic opposition to Soviet expansionism — and steering it away from the American communists and “fellow travelers” who had become prominent on the left during the Great Depression and World War II.

As the founders of ADA realized, the American left could not play a constructive role in checking Soviet power — or saving the achievements of the New Deal — unless it rejected  communists and others who admired the Soviet project. ADA’s emergence presaged a broader political shift, as leading labor unions marginalized or expelled communists and the Democratic Party turned against individuals — such as former Vice President Henry Wallace — who were seen as doing Moscow's bidding. Through the early decades of the Cold War, the center-left committed itself to opposing totalitarianism and its sympathizers at home and abroad. 

It was not only in the U.S. that the center-left distanced itself from the radical left. In Western Europe, socialist parties that committed firmly to anti-Soviet policies and democratic norms became influential political actors. But Communist parties that owed their allegiance to Moscow became outcasts. During 1947, for instance, governments in France and other key countries expelled communists from their coalition governments — in part because U.S. diplomats made clear that doing so was a precondition for Marshall Plan aid. Over time, this approach was tested, but it helped create a postwar Western Europe that embraced the welfare state and forms of democratic socialism while generally rejecting the extreme left.

With the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the internal and external challenges to liberal democracy faded in importance, simply because there were few internal or external challenges to speak of. Yet this problem has now returned, and it is manifesting principally — although not entirely — on the political right.

This time, the threat is not expansionist communism, but a combination of autocracy and geopolitical revisionism. China has been moving toward a dystopian future of high-tech authoritarianism, as it pushes for greater power and influence overseas. Putin’s Russia has consolidated an illiberal oligarchy, while using information warfare, political meddling and other tools to subvert liberal democracies in Europe, the U.S. and beyond. Both countries have touted the virtues of their systems, while arguing that Western values are a source of decadence, amorality and disorder in the Western world.

This is a moment when the “free world” needs to be strong and united. But instead, disillusion with liberal democracy has been gaining strength, particularly on the right.

In Europe, right-wing parties such as the Alternative for Germany and France’s National Rally (previously known as the National Front) have not simply campaigned on strident anti-immigrant rhetoric. They have also shown a questionable commitment to some of the individual rights and protections — such as freedom of religion — at the heart of the liberal democratic project. In the name of protecting Hungarians from immigrants and other enemies, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has erected a decidedly illiberal state that is steadily reducing the space for political dissent. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro has glorified a brutal military dictatorship and issued chilling threats against gays and other minority groups.

It is not for nothing that the political scientist Marc Plattner has written that the gravest threat to liberal democracy today is “that it will end up being abandoned by substantial segments of the right.” And even in the U.S., there are alarming signs that conservative commitment to the norms of liberal democracy is under strain.

A Republican member of Congress, Steve King, has proudly embraced “white nationalism.” Longtime conservative commentator Patrick Buchanan has lauded Putin as the model for “conservatives, traditionalists and nationalists of all continents and countries.” At the very top, President Donald Trump has praised neo-Nazi protesters, hinted at using violence against his political enemies, and called for the revision of laws that curb his power and his ability to harass the opposition. Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution, who has long been a leading conservative intellectual, warns that this disillusion with liberal democracy “is clearly present among American conservatives, and not just among the ‘alt-right.’ ”

The charge here is not that conservative policies — such as opposition to illegal immigration — are themselves tantamount to a rejection of liberal democracy. Or that hostility to liberal democracy has become dominant among American or European conservatives. But ambivalence about liberal democracy is becoming more prominent among right-of-center parties, and that ambivalence has profound implications for foreign policy.

In Europe, Putin’s Russia has supported — with money, cyberattacks and other tools — the National Rally and other parties of the nationalist right. Those parties, in turn, generally favor a return to normal relations with a country that persistently meddles in European politics and has dismembered two of its neighbors since 2008. Similarly, American policymakers have long hoped that Brazil would emerge as a bulwark of the liberal international order. Yet Bolsonaro’s foreign minister has proposed uniting with Russia, the U.S. and the Christian world in an alliance against the onslaught of “postmodern ‘liberal’ ideology.” Trump himself has recoiled from openly criticizing Putin and other strongmen; he has given countless indications that his sympathies lie with the world’s strongmen rather than its democrats. He has also supported illiberal parties within Europe; his ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, has promised to “empower” those parties at the expense of the center-left and center-right.

In fairness, the Trump administration’s actual policies toward Russia have been fairly confrontational, largely due to the efforts of Congress and more mainstream officials within the administration. But what all this indicates is something deeply worrying: That over the long-term, it will surely be difficult for America and its allies to resist the authoritarian challenge if their own political systems are beset by growing sympathy for illiberal ideas.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Most recently, he is the co-author of "The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order."

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