Sudan’s Lurch Toward Democracy

(Bloomberg Opinion) -- What’s worse than being ruled by one of history’s greatest monsters? The unfortunate people of Sudan are at risk of finding out.

Omar al-Bashir - who made the International Criminal Court’s most-wanted list for overseeing a genocidal campaign in Sudan’s Darfur region; who drove his economy to such ruin that the ATMs last year ran out of bills; who watched as a quarter of his people seceded to form a new country; and who once created a cozy haven for Osama bin Laden - was finally deposed as president in April after nearly 30 years.

The celebration didn’t last long. This month, more than 100 of the protesters whose actions had led to Bashir’s downfall were killed on the banks of the Nile by forces under the command of the military council that replaced him. Will the killing stop? Is there any hope for democracy?

For answers to these questions, there are few better to turn to than Judd Devermont. Now director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, he was the National Intelligence Council’s point person on Africa from 2015 to 2018 and previously held key jobs at the CIA and the National Security Council. Here is a (lightly edited) transcript of a discussion we had this week.

Tobin Harshaw: The world celebrated the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir. Was that a case of “be careful what you wish for”?

Judd Devermont: In the early days after Bashir was overthrown, there was cause for optimism. It was the product of four months of protests by a broad array of people, including a large role for women and the Sudanese Professionals Association. The resiliency and solidarity of that movement, and the terms which they were negotiating for, I think were really promising at first. But since the June 3rd killing of over 100 people on the streets, that optimism has really bled out. We're at a juncture where the military council is increasingly under the control of former Arab militia leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, usually called Hemedti, who perpetrated mass atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s. Under his leadership, the military council has no interest in really having a democratic transition.

TH: The military junta says that it wants to hold elections within nine months, and the democracy protesters are against that. Can you explain why?

JD: Initially there was a conversation about having a transition over three years or four years, but after the massacre, the military threw all of that out the window and started talking about nine months - in part because they would be the best placed to succeed themselves if it was a quick election. The opposition has a long view, that there'd have to be a number of structural reforms in Sudan to actually have a democratic process. Now, it's still unclear whether or not the nine-month timeline will stay, because it looks like the military is starting to waffle.

TH: What would some of these structural changes be?  

JD: The Sudanese opposition is talking about the constitution, as well as greater political inclusion. It's really a soup-to-nuts revision of the democratic project in Sudan. Arguably, they're right that there needs to be some time to educate and create an inclusive process, and to not replicate some of the mistakes of other countries such as Egypt.

TH: So why is Egypt involved, and what does it want? Is it simply that Cairo doesn’t want a democratic state on its borders?

JD: I think it's more nuanced. Egypt would like to see stability on its southern border, and they probably view a military government as the best route toward political stability. They are concerned about where the next government will stand on the Nile River, which is the lifeblood of Egypt. For a couple of years now, Ethiopia has been building what's called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Sudan has largely sided with Ethiopia on the creation of the dam, which Egypt feels would cut off some of their supply of the Nile. And so they're very clear that they want to have a partner in Sudan who is going to align with them over the Nile.

TH: The Ethiopians have been trying to mediate in Sudan. Why are they in this position?

JD: Ethiopia was deployed because Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is an energetic leader who has credibility with the protesters because of the reforms he’s instituted in Ethiopia. But he's also from the Ethiopian military, and so the view is he may appreciate the Sudanese military’s perspective. Ethiopia has long been of the most powerful countries in the region.

The downside in sending Abiy is that he has a full plate in Ethiopia right now. What he’s undertaking is fully remaking that state, and he's having a tough go of it, and he really doesn't have the capacity to do the shuttle diplomacy and really work with the parties in Sudan to get to a deal.

TH: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are funneling in a reported $3 billion in assistance, and they're clearly backing the military side. What is their goal and what is their interest?

JD: Sudan is essentially the “near abroad” for the Gulf states, to use a Russian political term. There is competition between the Saudis and Emiratis with Qatar over influence in Sudan. It’s also a playing field for Iran, which is no longer active in Sudan, but has been. And it’s an area in which Gulf states have recruited fighters for their war in Yemen. So it matters a great deal what happens in Sudan for the UAE and Saudi Arabia. And that's in addition to the longstanding commercial, political and religious ties. When he was in power, Bashir was able to balance Qatar, UAE and Saudi. His departure has opened the door for renewed jockeying between Doha, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.

TH: What's going to happen with him? He's wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.

JD: The Transitional Military Council probably will let him stay in Sudan or find him exile in a country that doesn't work with the ICC. They may do some sort of show trials and confiscate his money, but many members of the TMC and the military are implicated in these kinds of crimes, and I think they'd be really reluctant to turn him over. The protesters are more of a mixed bag. They may also not want to send him over to the ICC, for sovereignty reasons, but they would probably do some sort of trial, given his 30 years of rule and all the harm and destruction that was done.

TH: The U.S. has loudly denounced the massacre - which actually wasn’t a given with this administration - but is there anything concrete Washington and its allies could do?

JD: The U.S. has unfortunately been fairly absent since the April overthrow. They’ve said the right things, but they don’t appear to be really working on the issue on the ground. We don't have an ambassador in Sudan, which is a longstanding policy. What has been very productive in the past couple of days was, as I understand it, the State Department undersecretary for political affairs, David Hale, called up the Saudi deputy defense minister to raise Sudan. And we saw immediately a statement from Saudi Arabia talking about what is happening in Sudan and issuing their concerns. And so that is the kind of work that the U.S. needs to build on. I am gratified that the administration recently appointed a special envoy to facilitate dialogue.

It is an imperative for the U.S. to continue to engage the Gulf states in conversation. There is no solution that doesn't include the Gulf, but there needs to be a counterweight to Gulf influence. So that's what I would look for the U.S. to do – to work with and support the protesters, to work with and try to champion moderates within the military council – or at least elements of the military council that can make compromises.   

TH: Is there a U.S. role in terms of future economic development?

JD: Yes, but the limiting factor is that Sudan is on the state-sponsors-of-terrorism list. As long as it has that designation, there is very little the U.S. can do inside Sudan or to support it in any of the multilateral lending institutions. There was a process ongoing that was slowly unwinding some of the sanctions, under the Barack Obama administration and then the Trump administration. And there was an idea that it would eventually result in the lifting of the state-sponsor designation. With the change in the government of Sudan, it is certainly on the table.

TH: Finally, other than the obvious humanitarian and moral concerns, what is Americans’ national interest there?

JD: Sudan is at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East. It is an exporter of insecurity, or at least has been for most of its history, in the rest of the region. And if we're looking for a peaceful sub-Saharan Africa, if we are looking for a government that is going to be productive in the Greater Middle East and in Egyptian policies, I think Sudan is really important.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Philip Gray at philipgray@bloomberg.net

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Tobin Harshaw is an editor and writer on national security and military affairs for Bloomberg Opinion. He was an editor with the op-ed page of the New York Times and the paper’s letters editor.

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