There’s Irrational Confidence About U.S.-India Relations Under Trump

There seems to be an over-abundance of confidence that U.S.-India ties will continue to progress under the Trump administration. Relations may, indeed, see continued progress — but they will not be based on the exact same foundation that led to growth in recent years. Our energy partnership will likely see the starkest change and the defense relationship requires a great deal of sustained senior-level engagement — which is never a certainty. Other areas of friction are becoming evident, like the zero-sum ‘Make in India’ versus Make in America’, or possible restrictions on the use of H-1B visas. However, there are also a few areas where we may see increased progress in the years ahead and irritants will be reduced or removed.

The United States had abandoned India as a major strategic partner following Parliament’s passage of a flawed nuclear liability law and the dismissal of both the F-16 and F-18 as part of the multi-billion dollar Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft purchase. A mini trade war triggered by economic policy changes in India underscored the massive chasm that had grown between our countries. But the relationship moved on to a new footing thanks to shared priorities in climate change and fresh momentum on defense relations.

Energy Cooperation

With the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) assuming power in Delhi in May 2014, President Obama saw Prime Minister Modi as a promising new partner in securing powerful global emissions commitments for the fight against climate change. Apart from India’s commitments at the COP 21 climate summit, the Modi government has set admirable domestic targets to shift towards renewable electricity, albeit with local content rules that have irked American firms.

President Trump seems inclined to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, which would undercut this critical area of recent cooperation. If we are to see continued cooperation on energy, it will have to be based on a new set of factors, possibly including a pathway for increased natural gas trade.

Defense Cooperation

Less than a year after Modi assumed power in India, the relationship got another boost when Ashton Carter was confirmed as the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Carter had built up early goodwill in India through his leadership of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. He engaged India more actively than any other country during his two-year tenure. This engagement resulted in a wide range of practical and visionary agreements:

• Agreement on a range of technology co-development programs
• The powerful Joint Strategic Vision on the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region
• Speedy renewal of our 10-year Defense Framework Agreement
• Conclusion of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement

The last of these was the first of three ‘defense foundation agreements’ the U.S. had started seeking a decade before.

So far it seems apparent that the Trump administration will be very focused on making sure individual countries “pull their own weight” on global security. If NATO members are criticized for their lack of support for European security, India — which still has only a negligible role in global security — may get very little attention, barring some type of specific security actions aligned with American interests. At the very least, it will be difficult for any Pentagon official to match Secretary Carter’s attention on India, and ability to make tangible progress.

Economic Cooperation

Unfortunately, our leaders have not yet made progress in forging a shared economic vision. We have a range of useful work-streams on economic ties, but we have been unable to make progress in negotiating anything more formal to tie our economies together, such as a bilateral investment treaty.

Finally, the point that ‘Make in India’ and Trump’s domestic agenda are in direct conflict has understandably received a great deal of attention.

Areas Of Potential Progress

Despite the concerns that our energy and defense agendas may not make seamless transitions between U.S. administrations, there are other aspects to our relationship that may get a boost or, in other cases, witness a reduction in tensions.

1. With America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the U.S. appears much less likely to strengthen its trade ties with a range of Asian nations that would have excluded India. Indian agencies have highlighted the potential damage to India’s trade flows and investment inflows if such a powerful agreement were concluded.

2. The U.S. is less likely to highlight concerns about India’s human rights record, or domestic religious tensions. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report regularly calls out instances of religious persecution in India. President Obama himself broached the topic of religious intolerance in India at the annual National Prayer Breakfast, just after returning from the 2015 Republic Day celebration, saying,

These lines surprised many in India, coming so quickly on the heels of an important bilateral summit.

3. Another area of possible progress is in sharing sensitive technology, particularly in defense. There are a number of potential U.S. export deals on the table that have been held up due to concerns about sharing sensitive technology with India. President Trump’s agenda seems to value U.S. exports over technology controls, so Indian requests that would result in U.S. exports — as opposed to those involving large Indian local content requirements — could move faster than before.

4. Last, we may see increased U.S. energy exports to India. The United States has the potential to become a major natural gas exporter, though the federal government has placed limitations on the export of American natural gas. Importing nations must either have a free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S. or must receive imports from an individual U.S. export terminal that is licensed by the U.S. Department of Energy to export to non-FTA countries. The U.S. and India do not have an FTA. Some U.S. liquid natural gas (LNG) export terminals licensed for free export have signed agreements with Indian entities, so this alternative channel is being exploited to some extent.

Despite these examples of areas where U.S.-India relations may improve under President Trump, they are individually quite modest. It is unclear if our countries will be able to agree on a couple of fundamental drivers to maintain momentum in our relationship, as energy and defense had done in recent years. The Trump administration seems focused on a domestic agenda. The two main threats that are repeatedly referenced are concerns about China’s rise and worries about the rise of “radical Islamic terrorism.” India has its own concerns about both issues but has not wanted to make tangible commitments beyond statements, agreements, and exercises.

Richard Rossow is the Wadhwani Chair in U.S. India Policy Studies at The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

The views expressed here are those of the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of BloombergQuint or its editorial team.