Macron Has a Stake in Solving Mali's Political Crisis

(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Less than two months ago, French president Emmanuel Macron’s prescription for what ailed Mali was “the return of the state.” Taking the narrowest possible view of the West African nation’s problems, the French president suggested that the best inoculation against a resurgence of jihadist terrorism in the Sahel region was more government.

This view required a willful disregard of the political crisis unfolding in Bamako, where the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was already thoroughly discredited. For weeks, the capital city had been rocked by massive demonstrations as Malians protested Keita’s misrule.

The protesters were taking a broader view of the country’s problems, including widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, inept handling of the coronavirus pandemic and the flagrant rigging of the democratic process. For them, the government was not the cure, but the cause of much that ails Mali.  

The situation in the former French colony has only deteriorated since then. Diverse opposition groups have united to call for Keita’s resignation. Dissatisfaction with his rule deepened after a July 10 government crackdown on protests left 11 dead. Repeated attempts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to mediate an end to the crisis have come to naught. A visit to Bamako by the heads of five West African nations didn’t help either.

A strong nudge from Macron might, though. After all, it was a French military intervention in 2013 that prevented Mali from implosion. But France, which views Keita as a crucial ally in the fight against terrorist groups in the Sahel, is protective of the president. Some 5,000 French forces dominate a multinational counterterrorism effort in the belt of sub-Saharan Africa stretching from Senegal to Sudan. The French government, which tends to be almost reflexively repulsed by Islamism, is leery of the conservative, Saudi-trained preacher Mahmoud Dicko, who is the de facto leader of the opposition.

But Macron’s principal objective in Mali — to clear the Sahel of terrorist groups — cannot be achieved with a politically weakened Keita clinging to power in Bamako. “The return of the state” can only happen when the government has a measure of legitimacy. So it would serve both French and Malian interests for Paris to join the ECOWAS members in pressuring Keita to find a compromise with the opposition.

The Malian president has indicated he is amenable to a government of national unity, but opposition groups want parliament dissolved and fresh elections. (The last vote, held in March and April, was tainted when the constitutional court overturned results in 30 seats, many of them to the benefit of Keita’s party.) They also want meaningful reforms that would insulate the office of prime minister from presidential whim — Keita has appointed six in seven years — and allow for more transparency in government.

These reforms, if executed well, would make the state stronger and more accountable. That, surely, is in Macron’s interest as much as Keita’s survival in power.

And indeed, it is possible for the French to have their cake and eat it too. Dicko, the so-called “people’s imam,” has softened his position somewhat, saying a solution can be found without Keita’s resignation. The president’s second term ends in 2023.

France is hardly the only Western government siding with Keita. During the July 10 protests, J. Peter Pham, the Trump administration’s special envoy to the Sahel, tweeted that an “extra-constitutional change of government is out of the question.” The protesters, who were not demanding extra-constitutional change, took this as a sign of American support for the president.

Foreign powers unconditionally supporting an unpopular secular leader in the face of Islamist opposition because of the threat of terrorism — we’ve seen this movie before, and it doesn’t end well. By pushing for reforms in Bamako, Macron can ensure that the story plays out differently in Mali. 

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He writes on foreign affairs, with a special focus on the Middle East and the wider Islamic world.

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