(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Maneuvers in the U.K. Parliament to delay or prevent Brexit just keep coming. But don’t be misled: Amid the chaos, the politics have shifted profoundly. Whatever happens between now and his Brexit deadline of Oct. 31, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has won an important victory. Brexit could be delayed or cancelled altogether, or it might yet end in a cliff-edge exit causing huge disruption — but Johnson kept his word, and his political opponents are in trouble.
The starting point is to see that the agreement Johnson reached with the European Union is a tolerable outcome, and at any rate a big improvement over the deal reached by his predecessor, Theresa May.
One widely popular narrative among Johnson’s critics is that in settling for a “Northern Ireland only” version of the notorious “backstop,” he has acceded to a deal that May found unacceptable, and that he himself had strongly opposed. Thus his “deal” is not so much a win as a humiliating reversal.
This is blatant nonsense. Johnson’s version includes two vital components, both of which had previously been dismissed by the EU.
The first is an arrangement for collecting and rebating tariffs that lets Northern Ireland remain in the U.K. customs union. This is a messy and costly proposal, to be sure, and it does create a kind of customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K., which is opposed by the North’s Democratic Unionists.
Even so, the difference between this and the earlier EU proposal, which simply annexed Northern Ireland to the EU for trade-policy purposes, is no mere legal nicety: In practical terms, it means that Northern Ireland will participate in new U.K. trade deals with third parties, an opportunity that Johnson rightly emphasizes. If the U.K. negotiates zero-tariff agreements with partners outside the EU, consumers in Northern Ireland would see import prices (for final goods not bound elsewhere) fall as in the rest of the country.
Moreover — here’s the second difference — that first EU backstop proposal would have kept Northern Ireland, and then at May’s insistence the entire U.K., inside the EU customs union and locked to the single market (with no say in its policies) for as long as the EU saw fit. The terms provided no exit clause for the U.K. or the province.
Indeed the EU laughed at the idea that such a clause might be granted. The backstop is an insurance policy, it said. What’s the point if it can be cancelled just like that? The EU’s many spokesmen loyally parroted this line. Well, under the terms negotiated by Johnson, the decision rests with Northern Ireland. The province stays inside the U.K customs union and aligned with the EU single market for goods unless Northern Ireland chooses otherwise.
There’s also a simpler point, decisive in political terms. For months after May’s capitulation, the EU said the withdrawal agreement she’d agreed to was Europe’s last and final offer. May accepted this ridiculous declaration (when has any decision in Europe ever been final?) even as her deal was defeated three times in Parliament. In due course, Johnson’s critics laughed — this time at his inability to understand that the EU had spoken, and that was that. Some went further: Since the EU wasn’t going to reopen the deal, and since Johnson surely understood this, his real purpose was to bring about the hardest possible no-deal Brexit. Was there no limit to the man’s bad faith?
Oh, wait. The EU agreed to reopen the deal, came up with an acceptable compromise, and offered the U.K. better terms. In short, Johnson did what all his opponents said could not be done.
The U.K. is still divided down the middle between Leavers and Remainers. The most ardent Remainers are only going to despise Johnson more for keeping his word and proving them wrong. Even so, Brexit exhaustion is now severe, and much of the country wants Westminster to break the impasse and move on. Those calling for further delay are pushing against this tide.
And now their good faith, not Johnson’s, must be called into question. Until the EU offered the new terms, his critics were able to claim that the government was risking a catastrophic no-deal Brexit. This argument no longer works. His opponents just got the chance to take no-deal off the table, and declined. Many of Johnson’s critics have also said, or anyway encouraged voters to believe, that their goal was not to reverse Brexit but to arrange an orderly departure. That no longer works, either. It’s increasingly clear that most of Johnson’s critics do in fact want to reverse the referendum by any means necessary, including by making effective government impossible.
Johnson might yet lose the Brexit battle — and then reap the benefits in a subsequent election. The Labour Party’s endless unprincipled vacillation on this issue, combined with the crippling liability of being led by Jeremy Corbyn, makes its electoral prospects bleaker by the day. The Liberal Democrats have been more consistent in calling for a second referendum, but in the coming election they’ll need to position themselves for the distinct possibility that a second referendum might simply affirm Brexit on Johnson’s terms. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionists, refusing to compromise and back Johnson, risk alienating what support they have left in Great Britain for their cause. At some point, moderate Tory Remainers, drawn to the idea of accepting an orderly Brexit and moving on, will either move to back Johnson or risk being cast aside.
Right now, admittedly, Johnson’s deal doesn’t look like a win. It is, though — and if his opponents fail to recognize that, the loss will be theirs.
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Michael Newman at mnewman43@bloomberg.net
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Clive Crook is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and writes editorials on economics, finance and politics. He was chief Washington commentator for the Financial Times, a correspondent and editor for the Economist and a senior editor at the Atlantic.
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