Welcome to Number 10, Boris Johnson. Now You Have Some Work to Do

(Bloomberg Businessweek) -- Boris Johnson’s installation as British prime minister caps a career as famous for its setbacks as its successes. Sacked as a reporter for the Times of London in 1988 for inventing a quote, he became a star at its rival, the Telegraph, where his stories were often more entertaining than accurate. On entering politics, he was fired as a Conservative Party spokesman for lying about an affair, then was twice elected mayor of London, from which position he managed to take credit for some of his predecessor’s ideas.

In his one job at the national level, foreign secretary to then-Prime Minister Theresa May, Johnson was sidelined from Brexit negotiations, the biggest foreign policy question facing the nation. Now he’s back in national politics, this time at the top.

Johnson’s latest comeback is a reflection of two things: his megawatt charisma and the Conservatives’ complete desperation. He’s one of very few British politicians—and the only Tory—on first-name terms with the public. He is always, simply, “Boris.” His gift lies not in oratory but in an ability to make people laugh, with him and at him. It was long assumed that this lack of apparent seriousness would stop Johnson from ascending to this position. Conservatives, after all, see theirs as the party of sensible, careful government. Pursuit of Brexit, by far the single most important issue for party members, has turned that on its head. Having tried for three years with sensible, careful May, they’ve become contemptuous of warnings from economists and big businesses and instead put their faith in someone who promises that everything is straightforward if only they have a little confidence.

In his first full day on the job, Johnson gutted May’s cabinet, replacing her ministers with a group of committed Brexiteers. But as every prime minister discovers, doing the job is harder than getting the job. And the challenges facing Johnson are the greatest faced by an incoming prime minister in decades. His Conservative Party doesn’t have a majority in Parliament. To stay in power, it’s had to buy the support of a much smaller party, Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party. Even so, the government can be defeated if only a handful of Conservatives vote against it. With May unable to get any controversial measures through Parliament, the body has done little for months.

That might be survivable for Johnson, but there’s still a great deal to do, most of it related to Brexit. On this, Parliament has proved better at ruling out options than ruling them in. The European Union, concerned about a return to terrorism on the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, insisted on a “backstop” clause in the deal it negotiated with May, which would require the British government to keep its rules aligned with the EU’s. That’s unacceptable to Parliament.

The U.K. is due to leave the EU on Oct. 31, giving Johnson roughly 100 days to persuade either the EU to drop its insistence on a backstop or Parliament to drop its objections. In his first speech as prime minister, Johnson promised a “new” and “better” deal, but also that the U.K. would exit the EU on time—“no ifs, no buts.”

In selling compromise, Johnson will face problems of his own making. For most of the time Britain has been in the EU, campaigning to leave has been a fringe pursuit. Conservatives who devoted their life to the cause were eccentrics, used to addressing small rooms on issues of parliamentary sovereignty and the European Court of Justice. As the referendum approached, Johnson was finishing his term as London mayor and looking for a route back into national politics. The movement to leave the EU offered one, and Johnson became the face of Brexit, lending the cause credibility and mainstream appeal.

The campaign Johnson fronted suited his style: big on promises, light on detail, dismissive of problems. After the referendum’s surprise victory, he hit May with volleys of complaints from both inside and outside the government (he quit as foreign minister in 2018), insisting that she needed to be more aggressive in negotiations, to believe more and demand more. If his goal was to create a vacancy in the top job, it worked. With Johnson arguing against her, May was unable to convince her party that the deal she’d negotiated was the best one available. Now that he has May’s job, he’ll have to persuade the EU to reopen a deal it’s said is closed and remove the Irish backstop clause it’s said is essential.

Many in the EU blame Johnson for Brexit—not simply for fronting the referendum campaign but for stoking hostility toward the EU in his days as a journalist. Johnson’s stated hope is that the EU, accepting the case that it will be happier with Britain outside, puts its grudge aside and agrees to leave the Irish border question for another day. That would be enough to get the rest of the deal through Parliament. A little likelier is that Brussels agrees to some kind of face-saving modification to the Irish section of the agreement, which would allow Johnson to argue that the backstop has been dropped. Johnson has said this option is unacceptable—and sold as much to Parliament’s Brexiteers—but that wouldn’t necessarily stop him from accepting it.

One final alternative would be to walk away from the talks with the EU. This is what many Conservatives want Johnson to do, and he turned their wish into a campaign promise. He argues that the EU would back down rapidly if he were to stand up from the table. But EU leaders say that, while a so-called no-deal Brexit would be damaging to them, it would be catastrophic to Britain, which would find itself suddenly having to deal with its nearest neighbor and largest trading partner without any structures at all. Government economists predict this would lead to a recession in the U.K.

Even trying to pursue this course could be disastrous for Johnson. Not all Conservatives are won over by his charms. Many of those who’ve worked with him dislike him heartily, regarding him as untrustworthy and reckless. They also see pursuing a no-deal Brexit as ruinous to their party’s reputation. From former Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond on down, there are at least 30 Conservative members of Parliament who are determined to stop a no-deal Brexit from happening. Astonishingly, May herself has hinted she might join them. On July 18 they flexed their muscles for the first time, passing measures intended to allow them to prevent such a scenario. If Johnson outmaneuvers them, they hint darkly, they might vote to bring down their own government and force a general election.

Faced with such a crisis, Johnson could call an election himself. He could even call for another referendum. Both are ideas that he’s rejected, but Johnson has broken promises in the past.

MPs who support Johnson take what they see as a sophisticated view of all this. One early backer among the ranks of ambitious ministers explained at a drinks party earlier this month that Johnson will be able to persuade hard-line Brexit supporters to accept a modified version of May’s deal. The Brexiteers who destroyed May’s premiership all backed Johnson for the leadership, the minister said, so they have an incentive to moderate their demands and support him.

This isn’t what the Brexiteers say will happen. Some of them actively want a no-deal Brexit. What would they do if Johnson asked them to vote for a modified version of May’s deal? It would be no good, one remarked, to bring back that pig with some lipstick on it. Johnson’s fate in those circumstances, said another, would be the same as May’s, but faster.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Jillian Goodman at jgoodman74@bloomberg.net, Tim Ross

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