Why China’s Debt Defaults Look Set to Pick Up Again

(Bloomberg) -- Chinese companies are facing a reality check after years of ramping up debt. A de-leveraging campaign that President Xi Jinping began in 2016 to curb risks in the nation’s financial markets has led to a crackdown on unregulated lending -- so-called shadow banking -- and tighter rules on asset management. That made it harder for some to raise funds to repay existing debt, leading to a record number of bond defaults in 2018. There was a respite in the first half of 2019 as the government tried to alleviate the liquidity crunch, but by early December defaults set a new record, due in part to slowing economic growth. Contrary to what many investors thought, state-owned borrowers can’t count on a bailout.

1. How big is the problem?

It’s big, with the potential to worsen. The total of Chinese onshore company bond defaults this year reached 148 by Dec. 9 -- well past the 2018 record of 120. Missed payments totaled almost 126 billion yuan ($17.9 billion) by then, compared to last year’s all-time high of 122 billion yuan, which itself was more than quadruple the 2017 amount. Private sector firms accounted for more than 80% of total defaults this year, according to Bloomberg-compiled data. Moody’s Investors Service said it expects 40 to 50 new, first-time defaulters in 2020, compared with 35 so far this year.

2. Why is that?

It’s a liquidity crunch, mainly. Investors and banks historically have favored state-backed borrowers and are reluctant to extend credit to smaller, private companies. On top of that, the government’s surprise seizure of Baoshang Bank Co. in late May -- the first such takeover in two decades -- cut many investors’ tolerance for risk. The one-year spread for top- and lower-rated corporate notes had widened to a record high level of 257 basis points in July before tightening, illustrating the risk aversion immediately after the bank seizure. At the same time, growth in the broader economy has been losing steam, and weaker companies are expected to experience funding squeezes and higher repayment pressure.

3. Where are defaults hitting hardest?

In 2016, most of the failures were in industries with excess capacity such as coal and steel. This time, delinquencies are coming from a wider range. In December Tewoo Group, a major commodities trader based in Tianjin, restructured $1.25 billion of debt in an unprecedented deal in which most investors accepted heavy losses. It was the biggest dollar-bond default among state-owned companies in 20 years -- undermining assumptions that such enterprises could rely on government support. A bond default by Chinese corn oil and steel processor Xiwang Group in coastal Shandong province sparked contagion fears in the region, where companies are known for guaranteeing each other’s debt. Earlier in the year, China Minsheng Investment Group Corp., a conglomerate with assets including property, aviation and health care, came under pressure from its $34 billion debt pile. Known as CMIG, it embarked on a mission to free up cash by slashing executive salaries and offloading assets.

4. How did we get here?

Chinese companies have been piling on debt for at least a decade, ever since the leadership team under Xi’s predecessor went on a borrowing binge in response to the global financial crisis. That kept China’s economy chugging but at a cost. The corporate debt to GDP ratio surged to a record 160% at the end of 2017, from 101% 10 years earlier. Xi and his lieutenants vowed in 2016 to rein in corporate borrowing and financial market leverage in an effort to reduce the risk to the economy. The government issued directives on how money is to be loaned and managed, with a particular goal of curbing China’s $10 trillion ecosystem of shadow banking.

5. What’s the impact of rising defaults?

Given signs that authorities are more comfortable letting borrowers renege on payments both in the domestic market and offshore, potential investors are reassessing risks. They’ve also grown more skeptical about the quality of Chinese issuers’ financial reporting. Kangde Xin Composite Material Group Co., a laminating film maker based in the eastern province of Jiangsu, was found to have fabricated 11.9 billion yuan of profits during 2015-2018 in an investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

6. Has the government stepped in?

Yes, but it’s stopped short of any outright bailouts. Since July 2018, officials have injected liquidity into the financial markets through measures such as cutting banks’ required reserve ratios. Regulators have offered banks cash and asked them to lend more to help small firms. In attempts to address the liquidity shocks after the bank seizure, China’s top financial regulators urged big banks and brokerages to provide liquidity support to smaller peers, which are the main buyers of corporate debt. The challenge will be encouraging market-driven efforts to resolve corporate debt issues without reinforcing the old image of a state-dominated financial system.

7. How does bankruptcy work in China?

In the current process, troubled companies get as long as nine months from when the court accepts a bankruptcy reorganization filing to agree on a restructuring plan with all parties. If they fail they can be declared bankrupt, triggering liquidation. Concerns exist about the government’s heavy involvement in major restructuring cases and the reluctance of banks to pursue court-supervised plans because they don’t want to bear losses. In practice, the process can be much longer and foreign investors have had limited enforcement rights on some state-owned assets, according to Pacific Investment Management Co.

The Reference Shelf

• QuickTake explainers on shadow banking in China, entrusted bonds, wealth-management products, what is CMIG and how China got serious about financial risk.
• Bloomberg Intelligence warns of higher risk for lenders in China.
• Chinese firms have worst cash flows since 2012.
• The riskiest sector in China: energy.
• Local officials in Hubei, Zhejiang corral corporate creditors.
• Chinese leaders back bankruptcies for zombie firms.
• Creditors in China see strong-arm tactics from governments.

--With assistance from Molly Dai, Shuqin Ding, Laurence Arnold and Grant Clark.

To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story: Tongjian Dong in Shanghai at tdong28@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Neha D'silva at ndsilva1@bloomberg.net, Paul Geitner

©2019 Bloomberg L.P.

With assistance from Bloomberg